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This note begins an exploration of one of the key legacies of the Soviet economic
system, the physical structure of production and economic interaction, and its
impact on the transition to a market-based system. It addresses some reasons for
the size of the "shock" to the economy subsequent to the liberalization of prices,
including the apparent disappearance of vast amounts of industrial output and an
inflation driven by more than just monetary factors.
Price liberalization introduced a fundamental change in the valuation system
for the economy which, together with the new freedoms from 'market liberaliza-
tion,' generated massive real effects independent of monetary policy. It involved
far more than an accounting change, or correcting for statistical biases, both due
to the massive structural deformations built into the economy by over 60 years
of investment and development decisions innocent of economic evaluation, and
due to the systematic, arbitrary mismeasurement of economic activity and capac-
ities. Thus a structure of production — location, capital, employment, materials
and energy use, etc. — was created, without any regard for economic oppor-
tunity costs, in an environment free of economic valuation and only subject to
'Department of Economics and The Harriman Institute, Columbia University. This paper has
benefited from comments by Steven Rosefielde, Barry Ickes, Danny Kahn, Dan Berkowitz, and
the participants of the Duke-UNC Mellon Seminar on Transition. I, of course, bear responsibility
for the errors and omissions that remain.
consistency in arbitrarily measured accounting units. This legacy of the Soviet
system constitutes a structure of capital and economic activity that is fundamen-
tally non-viable in an environment determined by market valuation, and hence
requires massive transformation at its very roots.
This legacy lies at the root of the apparent paradox of transition: a seem-
ingly massive collapse in industrial output that is coupled with high inflation,
particularly of industrial prices. Here I want to suggest that this "inflationary
deindustrialization" is a necessary part of an essential structural transformation,
and is only aggravated by policy measures aimed at preserving capacities and
maintaining production. The heart of the problem lies in the illusion of capacity,
measured in terms of final output, and of productivity as measured, after adjust-
ment, by economic statistics and, in particular, in Input-Output tables. Below
I will argue, through examples, that much of the drop in output is just the rev-
elation of economic inefficiency, i.e. much of the measured output was illusory,
while much of the price rise has been an attempt to cover immediate economic
costs that were ignored in the prior system. The need to account for these costs
reveals the non-viability of much existing capacity, its inherent "value destroying"
nature.1
Indeed, when producers are forced to cover the true market costs of material
inputs, they find that their structure of production, their combination of inputs
and factors, is unable to generate enough surplus to cover basic factor costs. Thus
payments arrears arise, coupled with further attempts to raise own prices, while
output contracts. This can be seen in a typical (stylized) dynamic of the Russian
transition: free prices lead to a rise in material input costs, raising production
costs that feed further increases in input costs throughout the chain of produc-
tion. Demand, however, limits the rise in output prices, hitting the ability to pay
wages and maintain capital, leading to wage, tax and payment arrears, the misuse
of amortization funds, and the shrinkage of capacity, while still tying up a propor-
tionate share of intermediate product flows. Central interventions, through loans,
subsidies or state orders to prevent shutdowns and maintain capacities, only com-
pound the damage. For they maintain fundamentally irrational capacities and a
fundamentally irrational structure of interaction, slowing the structural transfor-
1
 Throughout the paper I use the term "value destroying" in the net sense: the market
value of the output produced is insufficient to cover the full costs of production, including the
opportunity cost of the factors of land, labor and capital. The stronger sense of "gross value
destroying," i.e. the value of output is insufficient to cover the cost of even just material inputs,
is rare, but not unheard of, in the post-Soviet economies.
mation and freezing in place wasteful materials and factor use, as well as spurring
inflation through monetary emission.
It can be argued that this unfortunate dynamic is to a large extent a conse-
quence of the irrational structure of production hidden in apparently consistent
(adjusted) Input-Output (1-0) matrices and economic statistics. The purpose of
this note is to explore the plausibility of that line of argument by analysing the
kinds of distortions that were hidden in those matrices.
2. Soviet Pricing and I—O Matrices.
The four-quadrant input-output matrix, in producers' prices, has been long con-
sidered a useful tool for understanding the structure of the Soviet and other cen-
trally planned economies (CPE's) and the possibilities for near term changes in
the level and structure of economic activity.2 As such it should also be a useful
tool for understanding the structural issues and difficulties in transition from a
centrally planned to a largely market economy. Use of these tables must, however,
take account of the peculiarities of both accounting practice and measurement of
the basic economic flows in these countries, particularly in the Soviet Union.3
Since the raw data are always in the form of index numbers, they depend criti-
cally on the prices used to form those index numbers. The issue is deeper than just
considering the impact of indirect taxes and other surcharges/discounts/subsidies
applied on various transactions; it resides in the fundamental principles of price
formation and the resulting structure of consistent (e.g. producers' or 'adjusted
factor cost') prices used to measure and value transactions.4
In the Soviet economic system, the only relation that prices had to economic
costs and/or scarcities was through a general, average, requirement that prices
"cover costs" in most cases, where 'costs' were measured expenditures on mate-
rials, labor, amortization, etc., and those were in turn valued in similarly formed
prices. This created a consistency of 'circularity-in-definition' that lacked any
systematic tie to underlying economic values ("opportunity costs") or scarcities.
2Some classical references are Levine (1962), Hardt, et. al. (1967), Treml and Hardt (1972),
and TYeml, et al. (1972).
3See Bornstein (1970, 1987) and Treml, et al., (1972) for discussion of some pricing pecu-
liarities. Other problems created for the measurement and evaluation of economic activity by
Soviet pricing practices are discussed in Rosefielde and Pfouts (1995).
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 For example, Treml (1989) presents the 1988 Soviet 1-0 table in producers' prices, while
Rosefielde (1975) reconstructs the 1966 table in terms of adjusted factor costs.
Among other distortions, basic factors were seriously undervalued (land was free,
and capital-in-place virtually so), raw materials and natural resources were under-
valued, highly processed goods — in particular investment products and services
— were seriously overvalued, and inputs and consumables received differentiated
valuations, depending on the 'priority' (desirability in eyes of planners) of the use
to which it was being put. This means that the 'physical' quantities and 'valua-
tion units' behind different entries in the table are not generally comparable, even
after tax and subsidy adjustments and "adjusted factor cost" manipulations, and
treating them as such creates a distorted image of the structure and functioning of
those economies. For example, it can create the illusion that 'materials-intensity'
of production in centrally planned economies does not differ significantly, outside
perhaps the energy sector, from that of market-type economies (see, for example,
Drabek (1988), arguing the lack of significant difference between Austria and Hun-
gary, and the study of Gomulka and Rostowski (1988)). Indeed, the distortions in
the principles of economic valuation use in CPE's systematically hide tremendous
waste, exaggerating both net outputs and net income (economic value) produced,
while understating the productivity of that most seriously mismeasured factor of
production, capital. Thus, the size of the apparent collapse in industrial produc-
tion is seriously exaggerated, even if one ignors new economic activity generated
in the wake of the reforms.
Below we illustrate this problem with simple examples, and then return to
some of the implications of this for the economics of transition from 'socialism' to
'markets.' In the next section we present the analysis of a simple 4-quadrant 1-0
matrix, illustrating how inefficiency and the exaggeration of net output can be
hidden in one. In the fourth section we study the circularity of 1-0 pricing, and
how this is consistent with the hidden inefficiency illustrated in Section 3- The
fifth section returns to the discussion of some implications of these results for the
study of transition processes in these economies, particularly with regard to the
apparent inevitability of "deindustrialization."
3. I—O Inefficiency: An Example.
Consider a simple economy in which all activity is aggregated into two producing
sectors, RM - 'raw materials,' and MG - 'manufactured goods.' Final demand
is composed of C - 'consumption,' I - 'investment,' and G - other 'government'
expenditures including military. Net national income is accounted for as either
'wages' or 'profits.' Such an economy might be described by the following Input-
Output matrix in nominal aggregate 'values,' where the rows reflect the allocation
of the output/value of {RM, MG, W, II} and the columns — the full costs of






RM MG C I G
' 60 40 10 5 5 '
30 50 10 10 5
15 10 20 5 0
10 10 0 10 10
(3.1)
As usual, the matrix X = 6030
40
50 represents the apparent value of intersectoral
product flows (intermediate inputs), Y =




10 the final demand uses,
V = the15 1010 10
reallocation of value to uses making this accounting consistent.5
The hypothesis that we are investigating is that these apparently consistent
flows hide a much less efficient economy, in terms of materials use, due to sys-
tematic distortions in pricing. Indeed, the underpricing of intermediate inputs
and the overpricing of final demand products could produce B from the follow-


































This shows a loss in real incomes due to the greater use of products/materials
within the production sector, reducing the amount actually available for end-
5For a concise description of, and further references on, four-quadrant 1-0 tables, and a
discussion of the 1988 Soviet 1-0 table, see TYeml (1989).
6Other principles of adjustment are possible. For example, the prices of final goods could be
taken as basic, with all other valuations inflated to that level (with some structural adjustment
of relative prices) maintaining total value added while inflating the value of gross as well as
intermediate output. See the next note.
uses. Notice that in both cases the gross output is assumed to be the same;
" 120 "
105x =
The losses can be seen in the difference matrix
D=C-B=
5 4 - 5 - 2 - 2
4 6 - 5 - 4 - 1
- 9 - 5 - 1 0 - 4 0
0 - 5 0 - 1 - 4
(3.3)
showing the absolute shift in National Income and its allocation resulting from
proper evaluation of product/resource flows. The apparent 1-0 coefficients,
A =








with the difference being






Note that the net output produced with technology A, z, is much less than
V =
20
25 z = x — (Ax) =
11
15
This difference illustrates the exaggera-
tion of net output (national income) generated by the relative underpricing (resp.
overpricing) of intermediate product flows (resp. final output).
This phenomenon is quite general and is in no way dependent on our particular
choice of dimensions and/or numbers. To see this, let q € Rn , Q £ R n x n , z € Rn
represent the "true" physical indices of gross output, intersectoral flows, and total
final use of the product of n producing sectors, and let E be the (n x n)-matrix
7This need not be the case; indeed one might expect total output to also be exaggerated due
to the incentives in the Soviet system. It is also possible that some of the extra intermediate
product use is of unmeasured/unreported output, so there is a counterveiling tendency for total
output to be understated. In any case it makes no difference in this example as linearity gives
us one degree of freedom.
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of multipliers reflecting the input pricing distortions that, element by element,
generate the observed intersectoral product flows, and Q, 0 be the n-vectors
generating observed gross and net output respectively. Then the I—0 system, as
measured in national income accounts, x = X • e + y, e = ( 1 , . . . , 1), is generated
as follows (x — indicates element-by-element multiplication):
x = n x q
X = 3xQ
y = 0 x z
Xi = LJ^
11- = 0-7-
where the multipliers reflect the relation between a "true index" at the given
level of aggregation and the "physical accounting" index in national statistics.
In our example, Ui = 1, Vz,












distortions in the measurement of 'physical' indices.
Note that in the Soviet case, as illustrated in this numerical example, there was
no reason for ^ = £i, or for ^ = U{ or #;, Vj, as prices of given commodities varied
to different uses and users for priority and other policy reasons. Indeed, the various
components of Y had different prices, so that each 0{ might be a vector (^tj)™-!
for the m different end-uses accounted for in the table, and yij = OijZij. Thus,
although aggregate consistency of measured materials flows was forced by the
intersectoral balance methodology, there was little necessary relationship between
those flows and what actually occurred in the economy. This is true despite the
ability to find a consistent system of 'Leontief prices fully covering the "costs"
of production of the apparent output flows, including the required "surplus" for
factor payments, as will be illustrated in the next section.
4. Pricing Consistency and Measurement.
Here we illustrate the existence of sectoral input-output price indices consistent
with sectoral 'cost-covering' and the preexisting distorted micro-level prices. Any
such prices are determined by both intermediate input requirements and by the
required 'value added' to support the factors necessary for production. Thus
these prices are relative to the 'numeraire' used in defining the "value added"
in each producing sector. These prices have no necessary relationship to the
aggregation /valuation weights ("prices") used to generate the measurements in
the 1-0 matrix cells.
In our illustrative example, the apparent value-added per unit gross output in
each sector is given by
v = [ 25/120 20/105 ] = [ . 20833 .19048 ] ,
whereas the true surplus (net value) created by production is
v = [ 16/120 10/105 ] = [ . 13333 9.5238 x 10~2 ] ,
indicating a proportional distortion of q = 25/16 2 = 1. 5625 2.0 . This
value added covers all costs beyond those on intermediate purchases from other
producers. Hence we might write, for example, v (or i/) = w£+rk+ir, where (w,r)
are the unit costs of factors, (£, k) are the appropriate unit-input coefficients for
the factors (L, K), and 7T is the surplus covering all other residual (opportunity)
costs. These also reflect the per-unit surplus produced in each sector that is
consistent with fully financing the purchase, at the relevant prices, of the net
output produced. Hence v is exaggerated by the need to finance fictitious output.
Thus 'cost-covering' sectoral prices that generate the apparently required sur-
plus are given by:
c = v(I - A)~l = [ . 94047 1.0476 ] , (4.1)
while actual cost-covering prices are given by:
p = i/(I- A)"1 = [ . 93743 1.0459 ] . (4.2)
If, however, the apparent prices, c, are used to evaluate the full materials usage,
then the remaining surplus per unit of output is only
c{I - A) = [ . 13422 9.4788 x 10~2 ] < v = [ .20833 . 1 9 0 4 8 ] ,
while at the true cost-covering prices the per unit generated surplus is
p(I - A) = [ . 13333 9.5238 x 10"2 ] = i/.
Further, if the true prices p were used to evaluate the surplus with the understated
1-0 coefficients then the apparent surplus becomes: p(I—A) = I . 20725 .19071 .
Notice that this is very close (within 'statistical error') to v = . 20833 .19048
asppnc, supporting the illusion — due to the fact that the apparent I-O table, B.,
is consistent — that the apparent quantities reflect the true production structure
of the economy.
It is worth noting that, since total output is assumed the same, the per-unit
surplus needed to finance the much smaller real net output will be less than that
needed with relatively inflated final good prices. Therefore the "cost-covering"
price systems, c and p, need not differ greatly in level, despite possible large
structural differences, as net output and unit surplus move in the same direction:
(y,v) > (z, v). This is easily seen from the algebra:
Apparent Technology
x = (I- A)~ly
c = v(I-A)-1




V • X — p • Z
Thus hidden distortions are only reflected in the sectoral structure of prices.
Of course, if each sector's output were truly homogeneous then the conscien-
tious use of uniform "producers' prices" by the statistical authorities would elim-
inate the hidden distortions modeled here; all uses would be charged the same
producers' prices. The fact, however, that physically different products (goods
and services) of a given sector are used both by different sectors and for different
types of final demand means that the uniform use of producers' prices at the mi-
cro level can yield precisely the distortions pointed to here.8 All that is required
is that there be some differences in the subsets of particular products of a sector
allocated to differing uses for an index formed of producers' prices to undervalue
intermediate input uses (types of products) and over value final demand uses
(types of products), even after all explicit taxes/subsidies have been accounted
for.
This can be clearly seen in our example where the subset of RM products used
as inputs into the RM sector have a price index that is 92.308% of the sectoral
index, that used in the MG sector — 90.909% of the index, and the subset used
by final demand — 181.82%. Similarly, the distortion of the MG price index
8For example, automotive products use as inputs into agriculture are different from those in
mining or textiles or metalworking, which again differ from those used in personal consumption
and from those used in investment/construction activities. The same is true of the nomenclature
of virtually every sector of production, with the possible partial exception of nearly homogeneous
raw materials and energy.
from specific pricing of the assortment used in different sectors (RM,MG,Y) is:
(88.235%, 89.286%, 166.67%). Thus the consistent use of producers' prices fails to
address the issue of price distortions arbitrarily built into the price system when
agents need not respond to market pressure; such prices can hide the true structure
of the economy even when the aggregate value 1-0 matrix is fully consistent. This
creates serious problems, both economic and political, for the process of transition
from a command economy where such arbitrary valuations can persist to a market
economy where signals and perceptions of relative economic valuations drive most
economic activity.
5. Implications for Transition.
The process of liberalization and economic reform removes, if sometimes only
gradually, the constraints on economic behavior that maintained the structure of
activity reflected in full, four-quadrant 1-0 tables of command economies. De-
centralization and the allocation of ultimate responsibility for economic outcomes
to individual economic units provides both the incentives and the capability for
those units to respond to, and alter, the relative valuations built into the structure
of economic activity. They are, however, at least initially constrained by the in-
herited structure of production, the existing, largely technologically determined,
configuration of capital, labor, and materials input use, within which they must
strive to maximize value (survive).
The first impact of this freedom is typically seen in the move to raise prices
to cover full material costs, as well as to cover the dramatically increased costs of
labor, which previously were held down by subsidizing basic consumer necessities
and eliminating competitive pressure from Soviet 'labor markets'. Of course, at
those increased prices demand for many products, now not supported by plan
requirements, falls dramatically. To the extent that shipment is made without
payment, a liquidity and arrears crisis arises. In addition, amortization funding
collapses, as does maintenance of the already seriously underfunded capital stock
together with any real plans for its replacement/updating. This freezes the irra-
tional and wasteful structure of production, labor, and capital into place. Thus
the existing structure of production generates a self-feeding collapse of output, a
cycle of "deindustrialization," as the result of liberalization. Government efforts
to slow or halt the collapse by providing financial support for existing activities
run the risk of merely maintaining the inherited wasteful, value-destroying struc-
ture of production and factor employment, one unrelated to final use-value or
10
relative scarcity, that lies at the root of many of the economic problems of the
transition.
At the level of our example, the problem can be seen by comparing the initial
structure of production, (A,v) or (A, i/), given above with a plausible market-
driven structure of production. Suppose that, at the two sector level of aggrega-
tion, competitive market technology is given by
T= f 1 , 5= [ .18 .15 1 (5.1)
. 5 5 J
where T gives material requirements and s = w£+rk (for simplicity here and in the
subsequent examples) gives the necessary value added to support efficient factor
f 20
use in each of the sectors. Again let desired aggregate net output be y =
Then, assuming that these quantities are measured and aggregated in consistent
equilibrium (market-clearing) prices, we can calculate the gross output, x, and
fully cost-covering sectoral price indices, P, as follows:
71.765
65.588
P = s(I - T)" 1 = [ . 48706 .52059 ] . (5.2)
Notice that both gross output and price levels are much lower as greater efficiency
requires both lower factor use and fewer intermediate inputs to support the same
level of final demand. Further, note that the same gross output as before, assuming
sufficient availability of basic factors, produces a far greater net output (GDP)
than before:
ym = (/ - T)x =
A sizable part of the problem of transition consists of restructuring from the
(A, v) technology, supported by intersectoral relative prices p, to the sustainable
market structure (T, s) with supporting intersectoral valuations P. The problem
is aggravated when the initial situation is taken to be the illusory (A, v), and
even more so when the relative prices P are rapidly imposed from the outside by
competitive market pressure (eg. free trade possibilities). When P is imposed on
the initial technological structure, the net value added becomes:
P(I - A) = [ .075735 .0 3884 ] «: i/;
P(I-A) = [ . 11338 .087143 ] < v; (5.3)
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which is substantially less than required to support factor inputs in any of the
technological structures, even that of the future market structure, where P(I —
T) = I . 18 .15 is required. This means that the production sectors are unable
to cover total costs, so that payments (including tax and wage) arrears are apt to
arise, unless massive, unrepayable credits are provided. In particular, apparently
deferable expenditures, such as capital maintenance and enhancement and new
investment, are apt to be avoided, slowly undercutting the productive capability
and future prospects of the economy.
A similar problem arises with the initial price structure once liberalization
begins to reveal the true 'costs' of inputs into production. As noted in Section 4,
the actual surplus generated from initial 'cost-covering' prices c,
c ( / - A ) = [ .13422 .094788 ] ,
is substantially less than that the surplus required to maintain the factors of
production (i.e. to purchase the net output y):
v = w£ + rk = [ .20833 .19048 ] .
Further, in initial prices c, that surplus is insufficient to cover even the lower (as
properly measured) initial factor costs in the second sector, although an extra
surplus is generated in the first sector, when those costs are determined by v
supporting net output z:
i/x & cz < cy = vx.9
It is highly unlikely, however, that the unit net value produced, is, will be sufficient
in a liberalized environment as labor begins to demand greater remuneration for
its services, and capital begins to command a positive real return. This problem
of covering full costs is thus further aggravated by the tendency for wages, and in
some cases current capital costs, to rise dramatically, causing even the accurately
measured v to rise substantially to, say, V = w£-\-rk. Covering these costs requires
even higher sectoral prices, raising intermediate input costs further, and perhaps
causing final demand, and therefore gross output, to shrink. This is arguably a
major source of the financial problems facing unrestructured enterprises at the
9
 At these relative prices, RM earns a profit of (.13422 - . 13333) x 120 = . 1068 while MG
suffers a loss of (.094788 - .095238) x 105 = -.04725. While these numbers are quite small,
they do reflect a structural problem that needs to be addressed by altering the relative price
structure.
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beginning of the transition, and a principle source of the pressure to subsidize
industry in order to avoid widespread collapse (deindustrialization).
It is worth illustrating the final point with a numerical elaboration of our simple
model. Let < ™^r.,-,
 n , > where < l\ = .411111 k\ — 1
v<i = .095238 = wt2 4- r&2 - r.rr>™^ ? o
^ ^ > [ £2 = .250796 k2 = 2
and suppose that the wage doubles while capital costs are totally ignored: id = .6,
f = 0. Then easy calculation gives
V = [ .26666 .15048 ] » c(/ - A) = [ .13422 .094788 ] w i/,
implying that there is no way that current costs can be fully covered in the initial
price system c or even in p. The problem would only be worse if we were to consider
full capital charges in the extreme uncertainty of the early transition, say r = .2,
yielding a required net surplus (for full cost-coverage) of .446667 .550486 ,
exceeding even further the net value-added supported by the prices c. This should
be compared with the target required net value-added associated with the technol-
ogy (T, s): s = \ .18 .15 , where (with some abuse of notation) we set market{ w = .5 r = .1l\ = .26 k\ — .5£2 = .2 k2 = .5
The equilibrium prices required to support full cost covering with the initial
technologies and transition factor prices become
p = V ( I - A ) " 1 = [ 1 . 7 5 5 8 1 . 8 9 9 1 ] > p
or even P. In the absence of changes in the structure of production/technology,
these prices would propagate through the economy as each producer raises his
prices to cover both higher factor costs (given by the technology) and increased
input prices from others doing the same thing. This gives a sequence of increasing
prices that is, on average, approximated by the series
A n T P-
Were the world perfectly linear, and final demand independent of price (the ideal
world for central planning), then this process would yield a price system that
covered costs and supported the current technology for the provision of required
final outputs.
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In reality, however, these prices create resistance in both final demand and
intermediate demand, even if the latter is largely due to financing difficulties. Both
less valuable uses and less efficient (than the sectoral average) producers are driven
away, and the inability to cover full costs leads to a drop in investment in, and
even maintenance of, the capital stock. While the shutdown of the less efficient
and the shrinkage of old capacities begins a technological restructuring, major
technological restructuring calls for increased rather than decreased investment,
and that is undercut by the inability of many, if not most, sectors to recover full
costs of production. Further, the price adjustment process is apt to be cut short
by competition from outside, and from those firms that do succeed in adopting
new, more efficient technologies, perhaps supportable by the price system P. This
seals the fate of the old technological structure, insuring that market prices will
never be sufficiently high to cover its full costs.
Thus substantial structural change, altering the technologies in use, must even-
tually take place. How that might happen, and the paths the restructuring process
might take, requires a more detailed dynamic microeconomic analysis which goes
far beyond the static input-output tools used here. All that this static analysis
can do is highlight some of the pressures that will condition the transition process
and indeed make embarking on it a necessity.
6. Conclusion.
The point made by these examples is quite simple: the input-output tables of the
centrally planned economies, and in particular of the Soviet Union, systematically
concealed an extremely inefficient structure of technology and production, one
which is unable to reproduce itself (cover the full costs of production) at market
generated prices. What we show here is the possibility; we do not provide a
proof that that was actually the case — we only argue its plausibility. Indeed,
accepting this argument seems to cast light on the (initially) largely unexpected
difficulty of the ongoing transition from 'command' to 'market.'10
The existence and wasteful nature of the command economy technological
structure is arguably one of the determining, yet under appreciated, characteris-
tics of the difficult transition that we are observing. Liberalization in the face of
this legacy reveals the extraordinary costs of transition and difficulties of financing
restructuring, and creates strong incentives to soften the blow of liberalization by
l0See the discussion in Blanchard, et. al., (1994), especially the editors' Introduction and the
first chapter by Michael Bruno, for a survey of the more traditional explanations.
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subsidizing and supporting, through special privileges and licensing, the existing
production units and their technological structures. Such incentives are illustrated
in our example. Indeed, the existing structure rationalizes 'price-regulation' to
control costs, thereby maintaining a net-value surplus that could be invested in
restructuring. But doing so undercuts the possibility of successful restructuring
in at least two ways: it destroys both information and incentives for proper re-
structuring; and it allows current claimants to continue to control real resource
flows, tying those resources to traditional uses and thus undercutting structural
reform of the economy. That, however, is a discussion beyond the limits of this
note.
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